Beyond Justice, Beyond Peace? Colombia, the Interests of Justice, and the Limits of International Criminal Law by Acosta Arcarazo, D. et al.
	



	



	


	

	
				


 
	 !
∀#∀∃∀%&∀∋()∗+,∃−
%	∀∃−
./
0

12∀	3		
%	∀	1	
3		
0101
4
1∀(5∋(,(∗67∗3889∗):567:
		;

<∗)∗))∗)5)6)∗+6(:6∗







	=	

				

1 
 
Beyond Justice, Beyond Peace? 
Colombia, the Interests of Justice, and the Limits of International Criminal Law 
  
 
Abstract 
 
 
This paper explores the role of Article 53 of the Rome Statute and its ‘interest of 
justice’ standard in Colombia. After first providing some background to the ICC’s 
involvement in Colombia in the context of the so – called Justice and Peace Law and 
the more recent Legal Framework for Peace, we critically explore the reasons why the 
principle of complementarity is the focus of contemporary debates on the ICC in that 
country. We suggest that this discussion often ends in stalemate, with little space to 
move forward. In light of this, in this article we propose an alternative way to advance 
the discussion; namely, Article 53. We then consider whether, in order to protect 
transitional justice mechanisms adopted by states in order to end conflicts and move 
towards national reconciliation, the OTP has the power under Article 53(1)(c) to stop a 
prosecution on the basis that it is not in the interests of justice. Much here depends upon 
whether justice is interpreted broadly or narrowly. We advocate a narrow reading of the 
concept of justice, meaning that the OTP cannot use Article 53(1)(c) to prevent ICC 
intervention on the basis that it risks disrupting a transitional justice mechanism. As a 
legal institution, the OTP must not involve itself with such politically sensitive issues.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Atrocious acts of violence have been committed in Colombia for decades. At least since 
the early 1950’s, in a period that came to be known as La Violencia, political violence 
has been a constant feature of that country’s history.1 It is, in fact, one of the defining 
                                                 
1
 La Violencia refers to a period of time that began in 1948 with the murder of liberal populist and 
charismatic leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitán and ended in 1953 with the coup by General Rojas Pinilla. The 
murder sparked riots and killings, first in Bogota and then throughout the country, along political lines;  
conservative governmental and para-governmental forces against members of the liberal party.  
Contemporary guerrillas would emerge, in part, from the remains of those original liberal armies. The 
five years of La Violencia left around 250 000 deaths, in a country whose total population at the time was 
around nine million. For a useful introduction to La Violencia in English see Marco Palacios, Between 
Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia 1875 – 2002 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 
2 
 
features of the country’s political process – an approach that has become standard in 
most studies on Colombia and its history.2 For the last three decades, though, such 
extreme violence has come to be understood (from the perspective of international 
humanitarian law) as a non-international armed conflict.3 Despite efforts of some 
analysts (mainly inspired by former President Uribe)4 to frame the issue as a police 
matter, as civil unrest, or a struggle against terrorism,5 it seems clear that the armed 
confrontation between governmental forces (the police and the military), right-wing 
paramilitary armies, and a left – leaning guerrilla, has long passed the threshold 
established by international law to this effect.6    
Peace negotiations are part of the logic of war in Colombia. Since 1982, at least 
five peace processes have been undertaken:  one in 1982 – 1984, with the guerrilla (the 
FARC, the ELN, and other smaller groups), which failed. A second negotiation, in 1989 
– 1990, with a then-important guerrilla group (the M-19), which resulted in its 
demobilization and a new Constitution in 1991 (the FARC did not participate).  A third 
effort, in the late 1990’s, with the FARC, that failed again.  In 2005, a negotiation with 
the paramilitaries led to the demobilization of the AUC.  And, finally, since 2011, 
current President Santos is negotiating with the FARC in Havana, Cuba.  Thus, being 
aware that a definitive military victory is unlikely, each side of the conflict tries to gain, 
though violence, a better bargaining position -- fully aware that sooner or later a new 
negotiation process will start.   
                                                                                                                                               
chapter 4. Also useful is David Bushnell, The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 201-222. 
2
 The standard approach remains inspired by the ground-breaking German Guzman, Orlando Fals and 
Eduardo Umaña, La Violencia en Colombia. Vol. 1 and 2. (Bogota: Alfaguara, 2010). 
3
 A non-international armed conflict is defined as ‘protracted armed violence between governmental 
authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups within a State’; ICTY, The Prosecutor v 
Dusko Tadic, Decision of the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, IT-94-1-A, 2 
October 1995, para 70.  
4
 Álvaro Uribe served as President of Colombia between 2002 and 2010. 
5
 For an enumeration of the arguments put forward by former President Uribe to deny that the Colombian 
confrontation is an internal armed conflict see Libardo Botero (ed.), La Estratagema Terrorista: Las 
Razones del Presidente Uribe para no Aceptar la Existencia de un Conflicto Armado Interno en 
Colombia (Bogota: Fundación Centro de Pensamiento Primero, 2008).  
6
 See generally Antonhy Cullen, The Concept of Non-International Armed Conflict in International 
Humanitarian Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 117-157.  Here Cullen describes the 
threshold set by the ICTY in Tadic in order for internal violence to be classified as a non-international 
armed conflict and thus subject to international humanitarian law. 
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It is in this context of extreme violence, and of an ongoing peace negotiation, 
that Colombia approached the negotiation and adoption of the Rome Statute that created 
the International Criminal Court (ICC). Since its very first moment, Colombia’s 
engagement with the ICC has been read by all actors of the conflict through the prism of 
the various peace negotiations undertaken by the government with the guerrilla, on one 
side, and the paramilitaries, on the other.  Colombia was one of the first countries to 
ratify the Rome Statute once it entered into force on 1 July 2002.7 Colombia signed the 
Statute on 10 December 1998, which was then ratified via Law No. 742 from 2002.8 It 
deposited the instrument of ratification on 5 August 2002 and, in accordance with 
Article 126, the Statute entered into force for Colombia on 1 November 2002. 
Importantly, Colombia made use of Article 124, which allows ratifying countries to 
refuse to accept the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) with respect 
to war crimes committed by its nationals or on its territory for a seven year period. 
Despite the academic discussion and critiques that the inclusion of Article 124 elicited, 
and the fact that this Article played a central role ‘in securing support for the final draft 
of the Statute’,9 Colombia and France were the only two countries to make use of it. 
France, however, withdrew its Article 124 declaration on 13 August 2008.10 Whereas 
Colombia’s official motivation for making use of Article 124 was that it would help 
                                                 
7
 The Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002 after the necessary ratification by 60 countries had taken 
place.  
8
 Law 742 of 2002 entailed that the Colombian government had Congress approval to ratify the treaty. 
According to Colombian Constitutional Court Decision C578 of 2002, the Statute became part of the 
Colombian legal system. A further Constitutional reform was needed, though, as life imprisonment 
(which is considered in the Statute) was not allowed by the Colombian constitutional framework at the 
time. 
9
 Louise Arbour and Morten Bergsmo, “Conspicuous Absence of Jurisdictional Overreach,” International 
Law FORUM du Droit International 1 (1999): 13-19, p 15. 
10
 Shana Tabak, “Article 124, War Crimes and the Development of the Rome Statute,” Georgetown 
Journal of International Law 40 (2008-2009): 1069-1099, p 1070. The Review Conference of the Rome 
Statute which took place in Kampala in 2010 adopted a resolution by which it decided to retain article 
124 in its current form and agreed to again review its provisions during the fourteenth session of the 
Assembly of States Parties, in 2015. See Resolution RC/Res.4. 
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persuade illegal armed groups to continue negotiations with the government,11 some 
authors have provided different explanations such as Colombia’s willingness to 
preserve its important relationship with the US,12 its desire to prosecute its own 
criminals as a matter of national pride and, finally, the possible connections between the 
paramilitaries and the government.13 A posteriori analysis has, in any case, shown the 
ineffectiveness of Article 124 in achieving its official goal in Colombia, and the ICC 
may now investigate war crimes since the seven year period came to an end on 31 
October 2009.14 The ICC is therefore competent to investigate crimes against humanity 
and the crime of genocide since 1 November 2002,15 as well as war crimes since 1 
November 2009, committed by Colombian nationals or foreigners on Colombian 
territory.16 However, to date, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has not decided to use 
his/her powers under Article 15 of the Statute to initiate an investigation proprio motu. 
Nevertheless, the OTP has been engaged in preliminary analysis of several situations, 
including Colombia (since June 2004), which suggests the possibility of a future 
investigation. For this reason, a detailed assessment of whether the ICC is able to 
invoke its jurisdiction in relation to Colombia seems both timely and necessary. 
It should be noted however that this article will not only be of benefit to those 
interested in a possible ICC engagement in Colombia. This article will also be of 
broader concern to those interested by the relationship between transitional justice 
mechanisms adopted by states in good faith in order to promote national reconciliation 
and the Rome Statute.     
                                                 
11
 Rafael A. Prieto Sanjuán, “La Inocuidad de la Cláusula Opt-out o Exclusión de Competencia por 
Crímenes de Guerra,” in Corte Penal Internacional. Salvaguardas y Revisión del Estatuto de Roma, ed. 
Rafael A. Prieto Sanjuán (Bogota: Editorial Ibañez, 2009) 17-39, p 22. 
12
 Indeed, both countries have signed an immunity agreement by which Colombia agrees not to surrender 
US personnel to the ICC. See on this: Christian G. Sommer, “Los Acuerdos Bilaterales de Inmunidad y el 
Art. 98 del Estatuto de la Corte Penal Internacional,” in ibid., 163-189. 
13
 Tabak, above n 10, 1090-91. 
14
 Prieto Sanjuán, above n 11, 28-31. 
15
 Art 11 of the Statute. 
16
 Art 12 of the Statute. 
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II. Complementarity as the Focus of Contemporary Debates on the ICC in 
Colombia: Two visions of Transitional Justice 
 
Given the context described above, possible involvement of the ICC has become a 
central debate for scholars, judges and practitioners in Colombia and elsewhere. The 
key focus has been the debate on two models of transitional justice that have been tried 
in the country: a ‘minimalist’ and a ‘maximalist’ model,17 which we now turn to 
explore. 
The maximalist model is represented by the so – called Ley de Justicia y Paz (Justice 
and Peace Law, hereinafter LJP). The LJP was designed in order to give a legal basis to 
the negotiation process with the paramilitaries, which occurred between 2004 and 2010. 
The conceptual framework of LJP is ‘maximalist’, in the sense that it requires that all 
perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity are prosecuted and sentenced. 
To be sure, if all perpetrators are to be prosecuted, there is little incentive for 
demobilization, as the government has little to offer perpetrators other than the promise 
of a life outside prison – absent that promise, the perpetrators may prefer to remain in 
arms. The incentive for negotiation is, then, the notion of ‘sentencing alternativity’, 
which basically entails replacing the ‘main sentence’ required by the law for the crime 
(say, 40 years for homicide) for an ‘alternative sentence’ (a maximum of eight years 
under Article 29 LJP), in exchange for demobilisation and contributions to truth and 
reparation.  All this was to be done in a new specialized unit within the criminal justice 
system (the “Justice and Peace Jurisdiction”), which integrated the language of victims’ 
rights to the truth, to justice, and to reparations as one of its main axes18. 
                                                 
17
 Diego López-Medina, "Estándares Internacionales para la Investigación y Acusación de Delitos 
Complejos en el Marco de la Justicia Transicional: Su Aplicación al Caso Colombiano," International 
Law 16 (2010): 45–80. 
18
 The Peace and Justice Law does not apply to all demobilized members of armed groups, but only to 
those that were included in a list that government submitted to the Colombian Attorney General – those in 
the list are called “beneficiaries”. The first step of the process consist in a free version that each 
beneficiary must render before the newly created Justice and Peace Prosecutor’s Unit, in which the 
demobilized member has to confess all the relevant information they possess regarding the crimes they 
committed, which will allow the prosecutors to corroborate the facts. After this, both the prosecutor and 
the victims, who are allow to listen in, may request clarification, present evidence or report any relevant 
facts regarding the crimes. Free versions are not open to the public, only to the persons that had been 
6 
 
 
 
This view was supported by the Constitutional Court, which held that it did not 
contradict international human rights obligations agreed by Colombia.19 Moreover, the 
Inter-America Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) was also an important variable in 
support of this model.  The IAtHR has constantly stressed the obligation of states to 
ensure the victim’s right to the truth, to a judicial process and to full reparation of the 
wrongdoing, and has rejected blanket amnesties in transitional justice enacted in Peru20, 
Uruguay21, Brazil22, Chile23, and El Salvador24, which gave perpetrators of atrocities 
low sentences25. This was the environment in Colombia when the Alternative 
Sentencing Bill was withdrawn in 2003, particularly after the IACtHR decision of 
Barrios Altos of 2001, where the Court had all but declared that Peru’s amnesties laws 
were in violation of the Inter-American Convention of Human Rights – criminal 
prosecution, some prison time, truth, and reparation to the victims were required.    
The Supreme Court, in turn, also gave content to the same approach: it held that under 
the LJP, each demobilized paramilitary had to be prosecuted and sentenced for all his 
crimes, and not just a few of them. Even though the Supreme Court did accept that this 
could be achieved through several partial charges that could result in several partial 
sentences (thus sparking a difficult procedural debate in domestic criminal law),26 it 
                                                                                                                                               
recognized as victims by the Attorney General office. After the free versions the prosecutor initiates the 
investigation to verify the truthfulness of the information submitted by the beneficiary, and to clarify the 
facts of the crimes. During the ongoing investigation, the beneficiary is put under pretrial detention and 
his assets are seized in order to provide reparation to the victims. Once the investigation is finished, the 
Prosecutor presses charges before the Peace and Justice Judge, and if the accused accepts the charges, the 
judge will give a sentence, applying the alternative punishment that consists in a period of 5 to 8 years in 
jail. If the charges are not accepted, the case is sent to the ordinary criminal system, where no alternative 
punishment is available for the accused.  
19
 Corte Consttitucional, Sentencia C-370 de 2006 
20
 Corte IDH, Caso Barrios Altos vs. Perú, “Fondo”, Sentencia del 14 de marzo de 2001, Serie C. núm. 
75, par. 41-44. 
21
 Corte IDH. Caso Gelman Vs. Uruguay. Fondo y Reparaciones. Sentencia de 24 de febrero de 2011 
Serie C No.221, par. 195 a 229. 
22
 Corte IDH. Caso Gomes Lund y otros ("Guerrilha do Araguaia") Vs. Brasil. Excepciones Preliminares, 
Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 24 de noviembre de 2010. Serie C No. 219, par.147- 182. 
23
 Corte IDH. Caso Almonacid Arellano y otros Vs. Chile. Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, 
Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 26 de septiembre de 2006. Serie C No. 154, par. 129. 
24
 Corte IDH. Caso Masacres de El Mozote y lugares aledaños Vs. El Salvador. Fondo, Reparaciones y 
Costas. Sentencia de 25 de octubre de 2012 Serie C No. 252 
25
 Christina Binder, ‘The Prohibition of Amnesties by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, 
German Law Journal 12, no. 5 (2011): 1203–1230. 
26
 This is the problem of “imputaciones parciales”, which led the Supreme Court to overthrow the first 
final decision in the context of LJP. See, Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sala de Casación Penal, Auto del 31 
de julio de 2009, Rad. 31539, M.P.: Augusto J. Ibáñez. 
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also expressly rejected the idea that a transitional justice process would empower the 
OTP to try only some demobilized individuals:27 all individuals had to be tried for all of 
their crimes. Victims’ organizations, human rights activists and some scholars were 
quick to realize that JPL looked like a legal framework to guarantee human rights 
(particularly in contrast with the Alternative Sentencing Bill of 2003), but actually did 
something completely different.  In the words of human rights activist and scholar, 
Rodrigo Uprimny, JPL “was widely recognized as generous in the protection of victim’s 
rights, but its application would inexorably lead to the lack of protection of those 
rights”28.    
LJP’s system received a fatal blow in in May 2008, when the Colombian 
government unexpectedly extradited to the United States fourteen senior paramilitaries, 
on drug charges29.  The individuals were part of the LJP process, and could have fallen 
under the jurisdiction of the ICC.  While their extradition in effect shielded them from 
ICC jurisdiction (the US in not a party), the reasons seem to have been local politics: as 
part of JLP, the paramilitaries had started confessing crimes committed in association 
with politicians (mainly member of Congress) that supported the Uribe government.  
These politicians started being tried by the Supreme Court in 2006, and the government 
was fast losing valuable political support – in the middle of a reelection campaign.   The 
extraditions were a deathly blow the whole JPL machinery.  While the Justice and Peace 
Unit continued prosecuting mid and lower level ranks, the extraditions made clear that 
prosecutions of higher ranks of the paramilitary would face serious resistance.   
Ultimately, the LJP system led to very weak results: eight years after its 
adoption, of almost 4000 demobilized individuals only 14 sentences have been passed, 
of which only one is final. In Colombia, the maximinalist model of the LJP proved a 
                                                 
27
 Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sala de Casación Penal, Auto del 11 de marzo de 2010, Rad. 32852, M.P.: 
Jorge Luis Quintero. 
28
 Uprimny and Saffon, ‘Usos Y Abusos de La Justicia Transicional En Colombia’. 
29
 BBC Mundo, ““Extradición masiva de paramilitares” (published on 13 May 2008). Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_america/newsid_7398000/7398251.stm; El Espectador, 
“Extradición masiva de paramilitares” (published on 13 May 2008). Available at: 
http://www.semana.com/on-line/articulo/extradicion-masiva-paramilitares/92677-3. 
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failure in terms of actual prosecution or perpetrators: asking for the perfect world in 
terms of prosecution meant failing to do the bare minimum in terms of justice. 
Of course, one could argue that LJP has been successful if measured against 
other thresholds: for example, according to a poll made by the Colombian Centre of 
Historical Memory, 45% the general population in Colombia, and 42% of the victims, 
think that LJP has been helpful to do “some” justice with regard to the crimes of the 
paramilitary30. The point, however, is that the LJP represents a model of transitional 
justice that relies almost exclusively on the judiciary to achieve any results:  vindication 
of victims’ rights, reparations, and even truth. Therefore, under LJP’s own structure, a 
failure to adopt definitive judicial decisions implies a failure of the model as a whole, as 
the latter features few outcomes of significance different from judicial decisions.   
This experience led to a second model, the ‘minimalist’ one. This model is 
represented in the constitutional amendment referred to as the ‘Legal Framework for 
Peace’ (Marco Jurídico para la Paz – hereinafter LFP), which was approved by 
Congress in June 2012 in the middle of intense controversy. The LFP is designed as a 
middle of the road initiative between those who argue that peace with the FARC will 
require full amnesties for war crimes and crimes against humanity (which is, for all 
practical purposes, impossible if one considers the case-law of the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights),31 and those who argue that any pardon would be in breach of the 
Colombian constitution and international law – hence, bringing us back to the 
‘maximalist’ model. The Constitutional amendment, then, allows the Colombian 
Attorney to focus on the ‘main perpetrators’ of crimes, and give the benefits of 
suspended sentencing or non-prosecution to all others. In contrast with the idea of 
                                                 
30
 Centro de Memoria Histórica – Colombia.  Encuesta Nacional:  ¿Qué Piensan los Colombianos Después de 
Siete Años de Justicia y Paz? (Centro de Memoria Histórica, 2010). 
31
 See, for example, IACtHR, La Cantuta v. Peru, Decision of 29 November 2006  (Merits, Reparations 
and Costs). 
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‘sentencing alternativity’, which had dominated the peace process with the 
paramilitaries under the LJP, and by which all perpetrators were to be prosecuted and 
sentences could be commuted, the LFP proposed a process of selection, whereby only 
some perpetrators are prosecuted, but those who are will actually serve their full 
sentence.32 
 
The local political context of this model was the exact opposite to JPL and the 
peace process with the paramilitaries. According to a recent poll, while the general idea 
of a peace process with the FARC is accepted by 77% of Colombians, the idea of some 
FARC members not being punished for their crimes distinctively lacks public support:  
68% reject the idea of some FARC members not going to jail as a result of the peace 
process, and 78% reject the idea that FARC leaders avoid prison time33.  In October 
2012, the Colombia Attorney General issued a guideline establishing a general 
framework for the prioritization of cases, in the very same direction. The Directive 
acknowledges that its content was inspired by international criminal tribunals, and that 
it had been modeled in accordance with international human rights law, international 
humanitarian law and international criminal law since all these regimes allow for the 
prioritization of cases in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction. As part of the 
prioritization office, the Colombian Attorney General created the National Unit of 
Context and Analysis, which is in charge of prosecuting structural organized crimes, 
exposing patterns of violence and more complex forms of liability, such as superior 
responsibility.  
LFP was also considered to be compatible withthe Constitution by the Colombian 
Constitutional Court in late August 2013.34 For the Court, the minimalist model was not 
in contradiction with the international obligations of the Colombian state; however, for 
the Colombian Court, the possibility of selection does not include crimes against 
humanity, genocide, war crimes: all these crimes must be ‘prosecuted and judged’, and 
must be ‘attributed to the main perpetrators’. This decision was taken in the middle of a 
                                                 
32
 For a detailed overview of the transitional justice arrangement implemented in Colombia see generally 
Isabella Bueno and Andrea Dias Rozas, “Which Approach to Justice in Colombia?” 13 International 
Criminal Law Review 211. 
33
 Semana.  Paz Paradojica.  http://m.semana.com/nacion/articulo/paz-paradojica/264804-3 
34
   See Colombian Constitutional Court, Decision C-579 of 2013.      
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local controversy stirred by a letter sent by the OTP to the President of the Colombian 
Constitutional Court in late July 2013, precisely at the moment when the Colombian 
Court was convening to discuss LFP,35 According to at least one commentator, the letter 
was an answer to a previous request of information addressed to the OTP by the 
Colombian Court.36 The question that both the Colombian Constitutional Court and the 
ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) had to tackle was twofold: first, is selecting for 
prosecution the persons bearing the greatest responsibility for the crimes committed, but 
failing to prosecute lower ranks, evidence of a state unwilling to prosecute the latter? 
And second, if the most responsible perpetrators are indeed prosecuted, can their prison 
sentences be suspended? The Colombian government’s answer to both questions was, 
of course, yes.  The Colombian public opinion, human rights activists and scholars have 
different opinions.  Sworn enemies of the FARC and, paradoxically, human rights 
activists who accept the maximalist standards if the Inter-American System of Human 
Rights, would answer no to both.  Therefore, depending on the answer to each of these 
questions, the OTP would be lending legitimacy to the Colombian government’s 
framework of transitional justice with the FARC, or would be undermining it.    
In its answer, the OTP emphasizes that Colombia would be in breach of its international 
legal obligations if it gave suspended sentences to the ‘main perpetrators’ of crimes 
subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC. In that sense, for all the controversy that 
surrounded it,37 the OTP’s letter featured no strong opinion regarding the most pressing 
issue facing the Colombian Court (whether selecting the ‘main perpetrators’ was 
unconstitutional), but rather expressed the idea that, should a main perpetrator be 
selected, he or she cannot have his or her sentence suspended. That answer was much in 
line with the OTP’s interim report on Colombia, published in November 2012. While 
the OTP’s approach to the issue of prosecuting only most responsible perpetrators 
seems unclear, the government and Colombian General Attorney seem to count on the 
OTP’s support to this policy.  This seemed to be confirmed by the declaration of 
President Santos, after a meeting with Prosecutor Bensouda on September 201338.   
                                                 
35
 See letter from Fatou Bensouda to Jorge Iván Palacio; July 26, 2013.  Ref. 2013/0/FB/JCCD-evdu. 
Available at: http://www.ips.org/blog/cvieira/documento-fiscalia-cpi-sobre-cero-carcel-por-crimenes-de-
su-competencia/ 
36
 See Rodrigo Uprimny, La Fiscal de la CPI y la sentencia sobre el marco jurídico para la paz (MJP).  
Available at : 
http://www.dejusticia.org/index.php?modo=interna&tema=justicia_transicional&publicacion=1572 
37
 See Revista Semana.  “Una ‘carta bomba’”.  August 17, 2013 
38
 International Criminal Court OTP (2013) “Report on Preliminary Examination activities”, November 
2013. Available at: http://www.icc-
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Soon after, the OTP published its Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, in 
November 201339. Regarding the Legal Framework for Peace the OTP recognized that 
the nine parameters set forth by the Constitutional Court for the application of the LFP 
appear to show a commitment to ensure the compatibility of the transitional process 
with Colombian’s international obligations.40.  More recently, in December 2014, the 
OTP published its report for that year, where it noted that the Colombian authorities 
took steps to prioritize investigations and prosecutions of those most responsible for 
conduct relevant to the preliminary examination41. However, the OTP was clear in 
warning the Colombian goverment that any negotiations with the FARC that could 
result in a sentence that is grossly or manifestly inadequate, in light of the gravity of the 
crimes and the form of participation of the accused, would vitiate the genuineness of a 
national proceeding, even if all previous stages of the proceeding had been deemed 
genuine42  
 
For the LFP to be applied to a particular demobilization by the FARC, further 
action by the Colombian Congress is needed; specifically, further legislation will need 
to be adopted by Congress in order to articulate the legal detail of how the LFP will 
operate and to set up the necessary institutions through which it will function. At the 
time of writing, though, the peace negotiations at Havana carry on, and the precise 
architecture of a LFP-based deal remains unclear. Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that 
a key dimension of the discussion will be the principle of complementarity.  As we have 
seen, The principle of complementarity is contained in Article 17 of the Rome Statute 
and provides that the ICC can only engage its jurisdiction where the concerned State is 
‘unwilling or unable’ to genuinely carry out an investigation or prosecution into the 
                                                                                                                                               
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Documents/OTP%20Preliminary%20Exa
minations/OTP%20-%20Report%20%20Preliminary%20Examination%20Activities%202013.PDF, par. 
147-148. 
38
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alleged commission of an international crime. Thus, unlike the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR), the ICC does not possess primacy; the ICC‘s jurisdiction is 
complementary to that of national jurisdictions.  
  Au fond, the question in Colombia is whether the LJP of the LFP constitute an 
example of ‘positive complementarity’,43 thus blocking the ICC’s involvement in the 
country on the basis that Colombia is able and willing to prosecute those suspected of 
committing international crimes, or rather an example of legislation providing impunity 
to perpetrators, thus justifying ICC intervention in Colombia (and with the ICC 
assuming responsibility for the prosecution of international crimes) because the 
government has proven unwilling to prosecute those suspected of committing 
international crimes.44 
In deciding whether to initiate an investigation, the Prosecutor must consider 
whether a) there is a reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed, b) that 
the case is admissible under Article 17, and c) taking into account the gravity of the 
crime there are nevertheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would 
not serve the interests of justice. Let us examine each of these requirements in turn.  
First, there seems little doubt that there is at least a ‘reasonable basis’ to believe 
that international crimes within the meaning accorded to them by the Rome Statute have 
been committed in Colombia. A far more difficult question is whether the case is 
admissible under Article 17. Article 17 has two separate tenets. First, Article 17(1)(d) 
provides that the ICC will only have jurisdiction where the case is of ‘sufficient 
                                                 
43
 The doctrine of ‘positive complementarity’ was coined by the ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno –Ocampo. 
See ICC Press Release, ‘Review Conference: ICC President and Prosecutor Participate in Panels on 
Complimentarity and Co-Operation’, 3 June 2010. 
44
 See generally Kai Ambos, The Colombian Peace Process and the Principle of Complementarity of the 
International Criminal Court: An Inductive, Situation-Based Approach (Berlin: Springer, 2010); Jennifer 
Easterday, “Deciding the Fate of Complementarity: A Colombian Case Study,” Arizona Journal of 
International Law 26 (2009): 49-111.
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gravity’. This is clearly a response to concerns over resources; namely, that given the 
unfortunate frequency of international crimes and the failure of national authorities to 
investigate and prosecute them, the ICC could quickly become overburdened by ‘less 
serious cases’.45 If this were to happen, the effectiveness of the ICC would be severely 
diminished, with perhaps the entire system coming to a standstill. Both the OTP and the 
ICC have provided guidance on the gravity criterion. In its most recent, detailed 
consideration of the gravity criterion the Appeals Chamber of the ICC has opted for a 
qualitative approach.46 Indeed, this approach corresponds to Regulation 29(2) of the 
Regulations of the Office, adopted in 2009, which enumerates a non-exhaustive list of 
factors that can be used to guide the OTP’s application of the gravity threshold. This 
Regulation explains that factors to be considered include the scale, nature, manner of 
commission of the crimes, and their impact.  
With this in mind, given the number of international crimes that have allegedly 
been committed in Colombia, and their egregious nature, one could say with a fair 
degree of certainty that Colombia is a situation of sufficient gravity to warrant the 
attention and thus resources of the Court.47 
The second tenet of Article 17(1) is known as the principle of complementarity. 
This principle provides that the ICC only possesses jurisdiction where the state in 
question has proven unable or unwilling to effectively prosecute those suspected of 
committing international crimes. This discussion often ends in deadlock in the 
Colombian case, with little space to move forward. Ultimately, the legal debate turns 
                                                 
45
 Susana SáCouto and Katherine Cleary, ‘The Gravity Threshold of the International Criminal Court’ 
(2007) 23 American University Law Review 807, 818. 
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into a problem of pragmatism. Early on, when the debate focused on the paramilitaries 
and the LJP, most human rights activists in Colombia and elsewhere strongly defended 
the position that the law was nothing but a complex legal façade designed for the 
specific purpose of preventing the ICC’s involvement.48 However, officials from the 
Uribe government and other analysts argued that the LJP was, ultimately, as good as it 
got: in order to enter into some sort of peace agreement with illegal armed groups 
(mainly the paramilitaries, but also potentially the guerrilla), certain concessions had to 
be made, albeit without entirely sacrificing justice for the victims of the armed 
conflict.49  
The debate on the LFP, and the negotiation with the FARC, has followed similar 
lines, yet represented by different actors. In this case, civil society seems to be divided:  
some organisations (for example, the think-tank De Justicia)50 have adopted a pragmatic 
position that the constitutional amendment is, again, as good as it gets: a selection of 
cases must be undertaken in order to implement a transitional justice process. Against 
this view, an awkward coincidence of points of view has emerged, joining non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Human Rights Watch and a conservative 
segment of Colombian society (spear-headed by ex-President Uribe),51 all of whom 
argue that the LFP is merely an excuse for impunity, and will trigger intervention by the 
ICC on the basis of war crimes whose perpetrators are not selected for prosecution by 
the General Attorney, or on the basis of main perpetrators whose sentence is suspended  
                                                 
48
 See Comisión Colombiana de Juristas, El Espejismo de la Justicia y la Paz: Balance sobre la 
Aplicación de la Ley 975 de 2005 (Bogota: Comisión Colombiana de Juristas, 2008).  
49
 For a good summary of the diverging approaches see Fundación Social, Trámite de la Ley de Justicia y 
Paz: Elementos para el Control Ciudadano al Ejercicio del Poder Político (Bogota: Fundación Social, 
2006) 182-187. 
50
 See their positions at: www.dejusticia.org 
51
 This is an awkward coincidence as the Uribe government famously had strong differences of opinion 
with human rights NGOs during his administration. The fact that they are now on the same side, as critics 
of LFP, makes their agreement seem awkward.  
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– the latter being an unlikely possibility after the 2013 decision by the Colombian 
Constitutional Court.  
Each of these positions is designed and deployed mainly for domestic political 
purposes since the ominous shadow of the ICC’s involvement looms large in the 
Colombian political debate.52 Arguing that either of these architectures for transitional 
justice is a façade for impunity is less a legal statement on the law itself, but rather a 
platform for civil society organisation, opposition parties and victims to press the 
government to move in a certain direction.53  Why is it, then, that such a dichotomical 
mindset has taken over the debate?  The answer to that question lies not in the principle 
of complementarity as a legal construct, but in Colombian politics. Possible 
involvement of the ICC in the country would impose extremely heavy political costs to 
the administration. For domestic voters, it would imply a symbolic step back to the 
times when Colombia was internationally perceived as a failed-state - going back to the 
dark years when the FARC controlled vast areas of the country and the elected 
government was unable to undertake basic law enforcement functions.54 In a global 
context where Colombia is applying to the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development (OECD), and tries to repack itself as a respectable player in 
international politics and a rising economy,55 a formal ICC investigation would be 
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extremely costly and would be perceived as confirmation that the administration is 
unable to provide law and order - a political defeat that would be punished by voters.     
The threat of ICC involvement also weighs heavily on the domestic judiciary. 
Much of the discussion surrounding the first ill – fated convictions resulting from the 
LJP process was, precisely, whether such decisions could trigger (or in fact prevented) a 
formal investigation by the OTP.56  
By the time of writing, then, the ICC works as both leverage and a threat in 
Colombia. Both sides of the debate are keenly aware of this state of affairs, and tailor 
their interpretation of the principle of complementarity accordingly. There are, however, 
specific limits to this strategy, as each party becomes prisoner of their own rhetoric.  
Those who argue that either transitional justice architecture (LJP or LFP) is a façade for 
impunity have much more to gain by invoking the possibility of ICC involvement than 
with an actual formal investigation by the OTP. It is, ultimately, the possibility of an 
ICC involvement that provides leverage to press the government to provide better 
guarantees to victims or to deal with perpetrators more severely. Once the OTP files 
formal charges, this space of pressure and activism will disappear, as the government 
will have nothing left to lose. Those who defend the LJP or LFP as the best deal 
available, being of course unable to cast off the shadow of the ICC, in fact use this 
argument strategically so as to also justify the importance of the law they propose. In 
this sense, the LJP and the LFP are used as evidence to demonstrate that the government 
is taking purposive action in relation to the perpetrators of war crimes, which in turn 
prevents the need for ICC involvement.57 
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Importantly, there has been no formal decision from the OTP determining 
whether or not the Colombian government can be regarded as unwilling to prosecute 
within the meaning of Article 17(1). This being said, the OTP has officially visited 
Colombia on several occasions. During these visits the OTP has been keen to 
underscore the complementary role of the ICC, pointing out that the ICC will  only get 
involved if the LJP process proves to be a mere façade for impunity.  
More recently, in November 2012 the OTP adopted an interim report,58 which 
examines whether the ICC possesses jurisdiction in relation to international crimes 
committed during the Colombian conflict. But despite considerable analysis of the 
issues at hand, all in all the OTP reaches no conclusion as to whether Colombia can be 
regarded as unwilling to prosecute and thus whether an investigation should be opened 
in relation to Colombia; preliminary examination of the situation continues.59 It would 
not be unthinkable for the OTP to consider that the LFP, regardless of whether or not it 
has been adopted in good faith in order to encourage national reconciliation in 
Colombia, results in the shielding of some  individuals from justice within the meaning 
of Article 17(2)(a) and thus constitutes an unwillingness to prosecute. If that would 
happen, the battleground for those arguing against ICC intervention in Colombia would 
move from Article 17 to Article 53 of the Rome State and in particular its interests of 
justice standard that we analyze below.  
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58
 Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in Colombia Interim Report, November 2012, available at 
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This analysis is important for two reasons. First, it allows us to unpack the central 
issue of whether domestic peace-building arrangements in a situation like Colombia 
should be in fact relevant to the understanding of justice under international criminal 
law. The notion of ‘interests of justice’ focuses on the underlying tension between 
justice and peace, which is the major issue in Colombia (and indeed all post conflict 
societies that are seeking to deploy transitional justice mechanisms). In short, should 
transitional justice arrangements be permissible under the legal framework established 
by the Rome Statute? Second, the ‘interest of justice’ standard sheds light on the OTP’s 
discretion and on its corresponding need for accountability. In relation to the application 
of Article 17 the OTP presents itself as a purely technical institution that simply applies 
rules (complementarity) to facts (the Colombian conflict). This position cannot be 
maintained in the context of Article 53, which by very definition requires the OTP to 
exercise its discretion. Consequently, the ‘interests of justice’ standard places the 
spotlight on the OTP’s decision and raises important questions relating to how the OTP 
understands its role in peace–building. Should the OTP concern itself with matters 
pertaining to domestic politics, or should it understand its role as completely separate 
from the domestic process?  
 
III. Interpreting Article 53 
 
In an important but often overlooked (certainly in academic literature) provision of the 
Rome Statute, under Article 53 of the Rome Statute the OTP has the responsibility to 
decide whether ‘to initiate an investigation’ and, upon investigation, to decide that 
‘there is not a sufficient basis for prosecution because”’60 In making these decisions, the 
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19 
 
Rome Statute explains that a factor that has to be considered by the OTP is ‘the interests 
of justice’. Put concisely, the effect of Article 53 is that ‘the prosecutor has the 
discretion (subject to Pre-Trial Chamber review) to determine not to initiate an 
investigation or not to proceed to trial based on “the interests of justice.”’61  
This provision is of particular importance for those that argue that the LJP and 
the LFP represent bona fide attempts by Colombia to implement a transitional justice 
mechanism in order to end the armed conflict and move towards national reconciliation. 
This is because, as the Informal Expert Paper on Article 53 notes, ‘[t]he stance of the 
OTP with respect to alternative forms of justice should probably be framed, 
conceptually, under Article 53(1)(c) and 2(c) i.e., the prosecutorial discretion not to 
proceed where it is not in the ‘interests of justice’ to do so’.62 The question then is 
whether the interests of justice standard contained in Article 53(1)(c) permits the OTP 
to determine whether or not to initiate a prosecution on the basis that the state under 
consideration has deployed a transitional justice mechanism, and that to insist on 
prosecution would adversely affect the transitional justice mechanism’s ability to foster 
peace and reconciliation.   
It is therefore necessary to accurately interpret the phrase ‘in the interests of 
justice’. In a nutshell, in applying the ‘interests of justice standard’, what are the limits 
of the OTP’s discretion? Given that the Rome Statute does not precisely define which 
factors can be taken into account by the OTP under Article 53(1)(c), two options present 
themselves: an expansive and a restrictive reading of Article 53.  
                                                 
61
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 An expansive reading of Article 53 would enable the OTP to consider wider 
political factors in determining whether to initiate a formal investigation. In the context 
of the current discussion, an expansive reading would allow the OTP to make normative 
judgements about whether or not the deployment of a transitional justice mechanism is 
acceptable from the perspective of the interests of justice. For example, it would permit 
the OTP to assess whether a transitional justice mechanism has been or is likely to be 
effective in securing demobilization of armed groups. Equally, it would allow the OTP 
to venture further into the domestic political arena and evaluate whether in the 
prevailing circumstances it should be permissible to allow those suspected of 
committing international crimes to benefit from transitional justice arrangements, even 
if such arrangements are considered necessary (or even the last resort) by domestic 
(perhaps even democratically elected) political actors to enable society to move towards 
peace and national reconciliation.63 An expansive reading of Article 53(1)(c) would 
therefore confer to the OTP much latitude in deciding what the concept of justice means 
and, more importantly, how justice is to be achieved.64    
In contrast, a restrictive reading would heavily circumscribe the factors that the 
OTP can consider when engaging Article 53. In essence, the only factors that would be 
relevant to the OTP’s understanding of the notion of ‘interests of justice’ would be 
those that relate specifically to the facts of the case in question. This would include, 
inter alia, the severity of the offence committed, the particular characteristics of the 
defendant and the specific interests of the victim. If, for example, the severity of the 
case meant that justice demanded prosecution, the OTP could initiate a prosecution, 
even if a transitional justice mechanism had been adopted by the state. But the point is 
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that the restrictive interpretation would mean that when engaging Article 53 the OTP 
could not weigh in the balance wider political factors such as whether the national 
authority’s decision to deploy a transitional justice mechanism is normatively desirable 
in the circumstances. In short, a restrictive reading of Article 53 would preclude the 
OTP from entering in the political arena, reserving this domain for the relevant national 
actors.  
Which approach represents the correct interpretation of Article 53? In answering 
this question, the first point to note is that that Article 53 is not an exception to the 
principle of complementarity, and therefore does not override Article 17 of the Statute. 
Article 53 only becomes relevant in cases where the principle of complementarity has 
been satisfied; that is, when states have proven to be unwilling or unable to prosecute.  
If the principle of complementarity has not been satisfied, the OTP has no competence 
to apply Article 53, as the Court as a whole would have no jurisdiction.  In that sense, 
Article 53 is a second step that comes after the test of complementarity has determined 
jurisdiction. When deciding whether to initiate an investigation, the OTP must first 
consider whether (1) the crime is within the jurisdiction of court; then whether (2) the 
test of complementarity has been satisfied; and, finally,  whether (3) the ‘interest of 
justice’ is not served by an investigation.  
At the outset, we should note that the term justice is ascribed a broad meaning 
by Article 53, requiring the OTP to ‘take into account all the circumstances…’ 
According to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 
(VCLT), terms within treaties must be accorded their ‘ordinary meaning’.65 Conferring 
the phrase ‘taking into account all the circumstances’ its literal and ordinary meaning 
would seemingly confer to the OTP broad discretion (or in the word of Olasolo, 
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‘unlimited political discretion’)66 to consider any factor that he or she considers 
relevant, including securing domestic peace. For this reason, this expansive reading has 
received substantial academic support.67 For example, Washburn and Punyasena 
suggest that Article 53 ‘empower[s] the prosecutor quite widely to hold back on a 
prosecution for reasons of non-interference in a peace settlement, interference in an 
investigation, as well as social provisions in the article’.68 According to Ohlin, ‘it is 
difficult to think of a factor that would not be relevant’.69 Gropengieber and Meinbner 
agree, suggesting that the interests of justice phrase includes more than ‘just 
criminalization of an offence, because the circumstances of the offence, the perpetrator 
and the victim can be outweighed by other factors not related to wrongfulness or 
guilt’.70 For them, the ‘interests of justice’ means the realisation of ‘a peaceful 
society’.71 Goldstone and Fritz argue that ‘few would aver that [justice] is demanding in 
the sense that it is always retributive’.72  
We argue, however, for a restrictive interpretation of Article 53.73 We suggest 
that the factors that can be taken into account when interpreting this provision should 
exclude wider political factors such as whether the imposition of transitional justice 
mechanisms are normatively desirable. Four points support this restrictive approach. 
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First, although the phraseology of Article 53 requires ‘all the circumstances to 
be taken into account’ (emphasis added) and provides a list of factors preceded by the 
word including, the nature of the factors specified in Article 53 limit or qualify the term 
‘all the circumstances’. As Stahn has argued 
 
These criteria make it clear that the notion of ‘the interests of justice’ is linked to justice 
in a specific case (‘Einzelfallgerechtigkeit’) rather than general policy considerations. It 
is therefore doubtful whether Article 53 offers a vast space to weigh general interests of 
national reconciliation or objectives of peacemaking versus interests of individual 
accountability.74   
 
In this sense, when the provision is read holistically it becomes apparent that the 
framers of Article 53 never intended to confer to the OTP the power to deliberate upon 
matters that do not specifically relate to the commission of the crime in question.  
Similarly, for Dukic, ‘the structure of the sentence does not seem to elevate ‘the 
interests of justice’ criterion above the other considerations but rather subsumes more 
traditional issues that could be raised in this matter’, such as for example the interests of 
the victims or the gravity of the crime committed.75 To this end, ‘[i]t is therefore 
doubtful whether Article 53 offers a vast space to weigh general interests of national 
reconciliation or objectives of peacemaking versus interests of individual 
accountability’.76 Article 53 in fact reads that when deciding whether to discontinue a 
prosecution, the OTP can take into account all the circumstances that relate to the 
commission of the specific offence under consideration but not wider political factors 
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such as the restoration of domestic peace and stability and the attainment of national 
reconciliation.  
Secondly, although the Vienna Convention requires terms within treaties to be 
given their ordinary meaning, this applies only in so far as the meaning ascribed to the 
term does not conflict with the objects and purpose of the treaty.77 Now: the objects and 
purposes of the Statute are clearly set out in its Preamble, which explains that ‘the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go 
unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured’. Thus, the ICC is 
‘premised on an aversion to impunity and accountability for the commission of 
international crimes’.78 Consequently,  
 
[i]f the phrase ‘in the interests of justice’ is construed in light of the object and purpose of the 
Rome Statute, a construction that permits consideration of a domestic amnesty, domestic truth 
commission or peace process and results in permanently not initiating an investigation or 
proceeding from investigation to trial would be in principle at odds with the object and purpose 
of the Rome Statute, as set forth in its preamble.79 
 
In the words of Dugard, ‘justice, in the form of prosecution, must take priority over 
peace and national reconciliation’ and therefore Article 53 cannot be interpreted so as to 
permit the OTP to enter into a debate that requires consideration of wider political 
factors relating to peace and reconciliation.80 This approach is also taken by the OTP, 
for whom: 
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The concept of the interests of justice established in the Statute, while necessarily broader than 
criminal justice in a narrow sense, must be interpreted in accordance with the objects and 
purposes of the Statute. Hence, it should not be conceived of so broadly as to embrace all issues 
related to peace and security.81 
 
Thirdly, Article 32 of the Vienna Convention provides that if after the application of 
Article 31 the meaning of a treaty terms is still ambiguous or obscure it is possible to 
take recourse to the travaux préparatoires of the treaty. As the Human Rights Watch 
report into the meaning of Article 53(1)(c) makes clear, there is insufficient evidence in 
the preparatory works of Article 53(1)(c) to suggest that the framers of Article 53 had 
formed a consensus as to the exact scope of the term justice.82 However, an isolated 
remark by the Kenyan delegation is nevertheless informative. In the context of Article 
53, the Kenyan delegation explained that the OTP must be ‘free from political 
manipulation, pursuing only the interests of justice, with due regard to the rights of the 
accused and the interests of the victims’.83 This lends further weight to the argument 
that Article 53 was never intended to allow the OTP to consider wider political 
objectives when interpreting and applying Article 53. Instead, the OTP’s discretion 
should be limited to factors that specifically relate to the perpetrator and victim in the 
case under consideration. 
Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, Article 16 of the Rome Statute permits 
the UN Security Council to defer an ICC investigation or prosecution for a period of 
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twelve months, with the possibility of annual renewal.84 The one limitation is that this 
deferral must be issued under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; that is, the Security 
Council must determine that the situation constitutes a breach of the peace, a breach of 
international peace and security or a threat to international peace and security.  
Article 16 reminds us that the Security Council and the OTP possess very 
different competences and that these must not be confused.85 Indeed, this is recognised 
by the OTP in its Policy Paper, explaining quite clearly that ‘there is a difference 
between the concepts of the interests of justice and the interests of peace and that the 
latter falls within the mandate of institutions other than the OTP’.86 Importantly, the 
OTP acknowledges that the ICC must ‘work constructively with and respect the 
mandates of those engaged in other areas... [and] pursue its own judicial mandate 
independently’.87 Thus, all in all, justice should not be interpreted ‘so broadly as to 
embrace all issues related to peace and security.’88 
All in all, the effect of Article 16 is clear: when it is contended that a prosecution 
by the ICC is likely to disrupt a transitional justice arrangement, potentially leading to 
the continuation or recurrence of violence, it is not for the OTP to gauge and determine 
whether this is a real possibility, and if it concludes that it is, to discontinue a 
prosecution. This would require the OTP to step out of the legal arena and into a 
political one (and indeed a highly sensitive political area). As explained, it is the role of 
the Security Council, in line with its global competence in maintaining peace and 
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security,89 to suspend (perhaps identifiably) prosecutions which are likely to disrupt 
transitional justice arrangements and thus threaten peace and security.        
 It should be reminded that there is a logical order to the requirements put 
forward in the Statute: ‘interest of justice’ is a third step, that comes after deciding 
whether the crime falls under the jurisdiction of the ICC, and after the test of 
complementarity. In the Colombian case, this means that the narrow interpretation of 
‘interest of justice’ we propose would be deployed only if the OTP has decided that the 
transitional justice model chosen by Colombia proves that such state is unwilling or 
unable to prosecute at least the main perpetrators, as identified under the Legal 
Framework for Peace.  
If it has decided that the alleged conducts are indeed subject to the jurisdiction of 
Court, and (most importantly) that the transitional justice process implies that Colombia 
is either unwilling or unable to prosecute, then the OTP will be able to consider whether 
it is in the ‘interest of justice’ not to initiate the investigation. This latter analysis needs 
to be centred on the elements related to the crime and its circumstances (for example, 
considering the truth and reparation for victims of the Colombian conflict), and not on 
wider political considerations. 
Our proposal of a narrow interpretation is not an argument to prevent (or justify) 
the OTP’s intervention in that country. Surely, a narrow interpretation may imply more 
ICC intervention, if compared with a wider interpretation. Our point, however, is not 
focused on predicting such possibilities. Rather, our approach suggests that Article 53 is 
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a relevant variable to consider – one that is less radical than it appears at first sight. 
Indeed, this does not give the OTP competence to factor in one and all of the issues 
involved in transitional justice and become, as it were, a centralized global authority on 
the normative merits of transitional justice processes in the world. To be blunt, as a 
legal institution this would require the OTP to deal with issues and answer questions 
that it does not have the resources or perhaps even aptitude for. 
 
V. Interest of Justice and its Relation to other Transitional Justice Institutions  
 
According to our interpretation outlined above, when deciding whether it is in the 
interests of justice to initiate an investigation or to proceed with a prosecution under 
Article 53 of the Rome Statute the OTP can only take into account the severity of the 
crime(s) that has been committed, the particular characteristics of the defendant(s) under 
consideration and any factors of special concern relating to the victim(s). In this context 
it is interesting that in 2011 the Colombian government adopted the Victims Law (Law 
1448 of 2011) so as to provide victims of the armed conflict with reparations. In 
essence, the Victims Law creates a legislative, regulatory and administrative framework 
to facilitate the reparation of those Colombians who have suffered harm as result of the 
internal armed conflict since 1 January 1985. Similarly, the LFP calls for the 
establishment of a Reconciliation Commission, and other non – judicial mechanisms of 
compensation and transitional justice.   
This raises the crucial question as to whether such mechanisms result in the 
victims being adequately compensated and thus rendering prosecution of offenders 
unnecessary. That is, in the terms of Article 53, whether such reparations would make a 
prosecution no longer available “in the interests of justice”.  
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We submit that this balance should be undertaken by the Colombian polity and 
not by the OTP. As argued above, a restrictive interpretation of Article 53 requires the 
OTP to exclude wider political factors, which would include whether victims have been 
adequately compensated. In this sense, and at least in terms of the role of the OTP, 
pecuniary compensation for victims of crime and prosecution of offenders are mutually 
exclusive. Allowing the OTP to consider wider aspects of domestic politics would 
require the OTP to make a political judgement that it is not in a position to perform.90  
In the Colombian case, it would require the OTP to assess whether the Victims Law, or 
any other subsequent transitional justice framework, can indeed be instrumental for 
achieving enduring peace in the country. This will be quite difficult for the OTP to do.   
However, it is important to note that we are not arguing that a consideration of 
wider aspects of domestic politics would imply a failure to prosecute by the OTP, or a 
delay on justice for the victims. The OTP may decide against pursuing an investigation 
under Article 53 and still fulfil its mandate. As we have already noted, the 
characteristics of the defendant and/or the circumstances of the victim maybe be such 
that prosecution is not in the interests of justice. Moreover, criminal prosecution is not 
the only available venue to achieve justice for victims. Certainly, we are not arguing 
that all perpetrators need to be prosecuted at all times and in all places – we disagree, in 
that sense, with the maximalist view of the LJP that has led to unworkable requirement 
and, as we have seen, very poor results. A reasonable margin of flexibility in the form 
of prosecutorial discretion is of course needed. However, we suggest that by grounding 
its decision on wider political considerations concerned with peace, the OTP would 
place itself in the middle of a political debate that would undermine its neutrality and, 
perhaps more importantly, could end in a stalemate such as the one observed with the 
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interpretation of the principle of complementarity. The OTP must not understand its 
own mandate as an instrument to achieve political goals – desirable as they might be, as 
is the case of peace and reconciliation. We suggest that the interpretation of Article 53 
should be decisively anti– instrumentalist, in the sense that it must abandon, as a matter 
of principle, the expectation that its actions can be instrumental to achieve peace in a 
given domestic situation, such as Colombia. To be sure, the government as well as 
NGOs active in Colombia will have an opinion on whether to open an international 
criminal investigation is in fact conducive to peace and reconciliation in Colombia. That 
is their job.  
It is the Colombian political community, with its advantages and its 
shortcomings, that decides whether there is a link of instrumentality between criminal 
prosecution (or lack thereof) and peace. The OTP must not understand its mandate in 
those terms. 
 
VI. Conclusion      
   
As noted, the OTP has Colombia under preliminary examination. The objective of this 
article has been to explores the role of Article 53 of the Rome Statute and its ‘interest of 
justice’ standard in Colombia.  Put simply, whereas Article 17 requires the OTP to 
address the politically controversial issue of whether the government of the state in 
question has proven unwilling to effectively prosecute those suspected of committing 
international crimes, Article 53 allows us to ask whether the insistence of prosecution is 
necessary in order to attain justice. In this context, we argue that justice should be 
defined principally on the basis of whether a prosecution is demanded by the factual 
circumstances of the specific case in question. For example, are the characteristics of 
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the defendant such that a prosecution is not in the interests of justice? Does the conduct 
or situation of the victim indicate that prosecution is unnecessary? To be clear, we 
contend that the concept of the ‘interests of justice’ should not take into account more 
general issues relating to peace and national reconciliation. The ICC, and therefore the 
OTP, are legal institutions that should concern themselves with questions of law (have 
international crimes been committed and, if so, have perpetrators been adequately 
prosecuted?), not questions of high politics (should prosecution of international crimes 
be dispensed with because of the wider benefits this yields for society generally?). But a 
point of clarification is required: we are not arguing that a state that is a member of the 
Rome Statute is prohibited from adopting transitional justice mechanisms. As events 
from around the world indicate, transitional justice mechanisms can actually be very 
effective in ending or at least ameliorating armed conflicts. The point we are making is 
that as legal institutions the ICC and the OTP should not be required to assess highly 
politically sensitive questions such as whether by investigating and prosecuting 
individuals (and thereby disputing transitional justice mechanisms) peace and security 
will be adversely affected. Article 16 of the Rome Statute makes it quite clear that if a 
prosecution by the ICC is likely to have an adverse impact on peace and security, it is 
for the Security Council to invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter in order to immunise 
transitional justice arrangements (regardless of the problems surrounding the Security 
Council as a political organ, such as membership issues etc). All in all, the Rome 
Statute is premised upon a separation of powers, and confers competences and 
establishes safeguards in order to ensure that this is maintained.    
 
